> Source: https://vitna.ai/docs/routing/audit-packs
> Raw Markdown: https://vitna.ai/docs/routing/audit-packs.md
> Corpus index: https://vitna.ai/llms.txt

# Audit and procurement attestation packs

Bundle an organisation's declarative Stackfile, standing routing decisions,
signed runtime policy envelope, CI policy lock, RFC 6962 Witness price
observation Merkle proofs, provider compliance terms, three-provenance SKU
capabilities, rollout watchdog status, and compound pipeline Bill of Materials
into one self-contained, offline-verifiable `vitna.audit-pack.v1` file.

## Why an organisation pack exists beside a decision pack

[`GET /api/v1/decisions/{id}/pack`](../api/v1/engine/decision-pack.md) seals a
single routing decision and the observations cited when that one proposal was
taken. Procurement reviews, FinOps sign-offs, and model-risk governance audits
ask a wider question: what is the organisation running across every component
class today, what list and private rates is it paying, which compliance terms and
capabilities make each lane eligible, is any shadow or canary rollout drifting,
and can an external reviewer verify every figure offline without database or
network access?

`buildAuditPack` (`platform/engine/audit-pack.mjs`) assembles that full
point-in-time record into one deterministic JSON document (`vitna.audit-pack.v1`)
stamped with a canonical SHA-256 `digest` and an optional outer Ed25519
signature.

## Six-layer offline verification

`verifyAuditPack` runs with zero database queries and zero outbound sockets
across six independent layers:

1. **Envelope and claim integrity** (`envelope`): checks `schema`
   (`vitna-audit-pack-v1`), `format` (`vitna.audit-pack.v1`), recomputes the
   canonical SHA-256 `digest` over all pack fields (with `digest` and outer
   signature fields stripped and keys recursively sorted), and checks that
   `claims.citationBoundary` matches Witness's published claim boundary verbatim.
2. **Outer pack signature** (`packSignature`): when signed (or when
   `requirePackSignature` is set), verifies the Ed25519 signature over
   `vitna-audit-pack-v1\norg=<orgId>\ngeneratedAt=<generatedAt>\nstackfile=<stackfileDigest|none>\ndigest=<digest>\n`
   against a pinned `trustedPackPublicKey` or the embedded SPKI key.
3. **Stackfile, signed policy, and CI lock** (`stackfileAndPolicy`): validates
   `governance.stackfile` via [`parseStackfile`](stackfile.md) and recomputes
   `stackfileDigest`; verifies any embedded `policy.json` envelope signature
   (`vitna-routing-policy-v1`) via [`verifyPolicy`](verifying.md); and runs
   `verifyPolicyAgainstLock` when `governance.policyLock` (`vitna.lock.json`) is
   present so lane drift is caught offline.
4. **Witness RFC 6962 price attestations** (`witnessPriceAttestations`): for
   every entry in `pricingAndProvenance.observationProofs`, recomputes the
   canonical observation string and `0x00`-prefixed SHA-256 leaf hash, walks the
   `0x01`-prefixed Merkle inclusion path to the UTC day's Merkle root, and
   verifies the Ed25519 signature on
   `vitna-attestation-v1\n<coversOn>\n<leafCount>\n<root>`. Customer-entered
   private infrastructure rates stay separated under `enteredPrivatePrices` and
   never carry Witness Merkle proofs.
5. **Provider compliance terms and customer evaluations** (`evidenceAndTerms`):
   recomputes deterministic SHA-256 digests over every `providerTerms` row
   (`vitna-provider-term-v1`) and every `customerEvidence` row
   (`vitna-evidence-v1`).
6. **Operational and FinOps gates** (`governanceGates`): evaluates CI and
   procurement gates (`requirePackSignature`, `requireAttestedPrices`,
   `failOnRollback` when `rolloutWatchdog.verdict` is `rollback_recommended`,
   and `maxMonthlyCostUsd` over `summary.totalEstimatedMonthlySpendUsd`).

When every cryptographic check passes and all present layers are verified against
caller-pinned public keys (`trustedPackPublicKey`, `trustedRecordPublicKey`,
`trustedPolicyPublicKey`), `verifyAuditPack` returns `verdict: "verified"`. When
signatures verify solely against keys embedded inside the pack (unpinned) or cite
observations from an open UTC day before daily root signing, `verifyAuditPack`
returns `verdict: "verified_with_warnings"` and enumerates each warning. Any
tampered byte, forged proof, broken lock invariant, or breached gate returns
`ok: false` and `verdict: "failed"`.

## Cryptographic key separation and claim boundaries

Three distinct Ed25519 key roles participate in an audit pack and are never
conflated:

- **Witness record key** (`record`): signs daily observation Merkle roots
  (`vitna-attestation-v1`). Published at [`GET /api/v1/keys`](../api/v1/verification/keys.md).
- **Routing policy key** (`policy`): signs loadable `policy.json` envelopes
  (`vitna-routing-policy-v1`). Published at `GET /api/v1/keys/policy-key.pub`.
- **Operator or customer pack key** (`pack`): signs the outer `vitna.audit-pack.v1`
  envelope (`vitna-audit-pack-v1`) at export time.

Both `signAuditPack` and `verifyAuditPack` refuse key conflation if an outer
`pack` signer public key equals any Witness `record` attestation key, preserving
the boundary between first-party market observations and customer stack
configurations. Likewise, `claims` embeds `PROVES`, `DOES_NOT_PROVE`, and
`CITATION_BOUNDARY` verbatim from `platform/witness/claims.mjs`: Witness proves
what a vendor pricing page published when fetched, not what a vendor billed on a
private invoice or whether customer-supplied benchmark scores are representative.
Stripping or editing `claims.citationBoundary` fails verification with
`altered_citation_boundary`.

Export, sign, and verify audit packs from the CLI with
[`aperture:audit:pack`](../cli/aperture/audit-pack.md), export an authenticated
organisation's pack via
[`GET /api/v1/org/audit-pack`](../api/v1/engine/org-audit-pack.md), or run
stateless zero-retention verification and assembly via
[`POST /api/v1/audit-pack`](../api/v1/engine/audit-pack.md) and MCP
`vitna_verify_audit_pack`.
